Introduction
Demographic forecasts suggest that European welfare states are increasingly challenged by aging. For instance EUROSTAT's most recent population forecast predicts an increase of old age dependency ratios in all European Union (EU) countries in the next two decades (EUROSTAT, 2011) . As a consequence a number of analysts (e.g. Zimmermann 2008 , OECD, 2008 have called for increased immigration to relieve European welfare systems from the fiscal burden of an ageing population. Such a strategy, however, will only be successful if immigrants are net contributors to European welfare states. This, as has been shown by a number of recent comparative studies on the welfare contribution of immigrants (Huber and Oberdabernig, 2013 , OECD 2013 , Barrett and Maitre, 2011 , is more likely when immigrants are well integrated in their host countries' labour markets (i.e. when their chances of finding paid employment are high and their unemployment risks are low). The literature on the labour market integration of immigrants, however, often finds that immigrants face substantially lower chances of being employed and higher ones of being unemployed than natives.
A substantial part of this literature has therefore analysed the individual characteristics favouring immigrants labour market integration. It finds that better educated immigrants and immigrants with more host country specific human capital (e.g. language proficiency) have fewer problems in integrating into host countries' labour markets (e.g. Borjas 2000, Chiswick and Miller 2011) and that age at migration DebBurman 2004, Goldner and Epstein, 2014) , cultural or linguistic similarity to the majority population Miller 2011, Wanner 1998) as well as the years of residence in the country (Chiswick 1978 , Borjas 2000 have an important impact on immigrants' labour market integration. A policy conclusion of this is that immigrant receiving countries should select immigrants with better chances of labour market integration in their respective country and should provide incentives for immigrants to invest in host country specific human capital.
A further finding of this literature, however, is the huge difference in immigrants' labour market integration across countries (Dustman and Fratini 2011 , Hierländer et al. 2010 , Algan et al, 2010 , Münz 2007 . For instance OECD (2008) reports that among European OECD countries employment rate differentials between high skilled immigrants and natives range from -25 percentage point (to the disadvantage of immigrants) in Finland to -2.3 percentage points in Portugal. These vast differences are unlikely to be explained by the composition of immigrants alone, but are likely to also be related to differences in national migration policy and labour market institutions (Dustman and Fratini, 2011 ). Yet, only few studies have so far analysed the relationship between national labour market and migration policy institutions on immigrants' labour market integration. Most of these focus on case studies of a few countries to highlight the importance of compositional effects (Cangiano, 2012 , LewinEpstein et al, 2003 , migration policy (Rendall et al 2010 , Cangiano, 2012 , welfare state regimes and labour market institutions (Antecol et al, 2004) in determining immigrants labour market outcomes. These studies, however, often lack the data to formally test their hypothesis. The few cross country comparative studies, by contrast, often focus on different labour market indicators to measure immigrants' labour market integration and also come to rather different conclusions. For instance Kogan (2006) finds that male immigrants' employment disadvantages are lower in liberal welfare states marked by flexible labour markets; Fleischman and Dronkers (2010) , by contrast, find that countries' integration policies and welfare state regimes do not affect immigrants' unemployment risks.
In this paper we also analyse the impact of national labour market and migration policy institutions on immigrants' labour market integration. We, however, extend on -3 -previous literature both in terms of focus and methodology. In terms of focus, in contrast to previous studies, that often focus on a country's welfare state regime (as defined by Esping-Andersen, 1990), we concentrate on measures of labour market institutions such as wage bargaining institutions, replacement rates or minimum wages that have been amply used in the literature explaining differences in natives' labour market outcomes (e.g. Baccaro and Rei 2007 , Nickel et al. 2005 , Sachs 2012 ) and use both employment and unemployment rate differentials between natives and immigrants to measure immigrants' labour market integration.
Methodologically, following a recent contribution by Schneeweis (2011) that looks at the impact of education institutions on educational attainment of immigrants, we apply a two-step procedure. First, we decompose the differences in labour market integration between natives and foreign born into one (explained) component, due to differences in observable characteristics (such as age, gender and education) between these two groups, and another (unexplained) component, due to differences in the "returns" to these variables. Second, these components are then correlated to labour market and migration policy institutions. We, however, extend on Schneeweiss (2011) by explicitly accounting for model uncertainty in the analysis through Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (Sala-i-Martin et al. 2000) . This has the additional advantage of allowing for the analysis of a larger set of variables than previously considered.
Theory and Method
The starting point of our analysis is that the disadvantages of immigrants in terms of labour market integration relative to natives in a country may be due either to immigrants having characteristics that make them more prone to have worse labour market outcomes (i.e. due to compositional effects) or to immigrants having worse labour market outcomes than observationally equivalent natives. To analyse the -4 -differences in labour market outcomes between immigrants and natives, therefore, a comparable measure of labour market integration across countries and time periods is needed. To derive this, we follow Schneeweiss (2011) and use Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions to decompose the raw employment and unemployment probability differences between immigrants and natives into one component due to differences in characteristics between immigrants and natives in a country and another one that remains unexplained.
Specifically we consider a set of binary labour market outcomes (such as unemployment or employment) of individual i belonging to population group j (which may be natives -indexed by n -or immigrants -indexed by m) in country c at time t, that are captured by the variable Γ and let Γ total difference between natives and foreign born in this outcome, given estimates of (derived from probit regressions and denoted by � ) can be decomposed into the two components of interest by noting that:
with a bar over variables indicating sample means and Φ the standard normal cumulative density function.
The first term in square brackets on the left hand side of equation (1) is the difference in characteristics effect reflecting differences in the composition of immigrants and natives in a particular country. This should be higher in countries which -5 -attract immigrants that (relative to natives) have less favourable characteristics for labour market integration. In this respect previous research (Kao and Thompson, 2003 , Fleischmann and Dronkers, 2010 , Van Tubergen et al. 2004 ) has found sending country structure to be an important explanatory variable to explain differences in labour market integration among immigrants. This component may, however, also be related to migration policy variables as for instance Rendall et al. (2010) and Cangiano (2012) amongst others find that immigrants entering the host country under family reunion schemes have less favourable characteristics than migrants entering under labour market quota. Furthermore, this component may be influenced by the welfare state and wage setting institutions of a country. This will be the case, if as argued by the welfare magnet hypothesis of migration (Borjas 1999 , Levine and Zimmermann 1999 , Nowotny 2011 , immigrants with lower chances of labour market integration are particularly attracted to countries with a generous welfare state, if less skilled immigrants are particularly strongly drawn to countries where the wage structure is more compressed, as hypothesized by self-selection theories of migration (Borjas 1987 , Chiswick 1999 We test these hypotheses by separately regressing the explained and the unexplained component of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition on a set of explanatory variables reflecting these hypotheses. Denoting the explained component of the OaxacaBlinder decomposition for country c at time t by (i.e.
and the potential explanatory variables by X ct and Y ct we consider regressions of the form:
and
to test for the impact of various institutional factors impacting on these components.
There are a number of issues that have to be addressed with this procedure. The first is related to the interpretation of the components of the Oaxaca -Blinder decomposition: These as shown by for instance Kunze (2007) and Huber (2014) can be interpreted causally only if both the group variable used to define the decomposition (in our case immigrants status) as well as all the control variables (X ct and Y ct ) are exogenous. From the point of view of our application the first of these conditions should be less problematic if we measure immigrant status by country of birth, since country of birth should be as good as randomly assigned.
2 2 This, however, would not be the case when migrant status is defined by nationality, since more able migrants could self-select into naturalization.
The exogeneity of the control variables, however, is will be questionable if more able immigrants self-select into countries offering them better conditions. Thus if immigrants with better unobserved abilities positively (negatively) self-select to certain countries, our estimates of the explained component for an individual country are under-(over-) estimated and those of the unexplained component are over-(under-) estimated. Although the possibility of such a self-selection cannot be excluded this bias will be mitigated by non-economically motivated migration, which according to some estimates (e.g. Constant and
Zimmermann 2005) is as high as 84% of all migration.
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The second issue is model uncertainty. This arises because theoretical considerations suggest a rather large set of variables that may impact on immigrants' labour market integration, with theory being rather unspecific as to which variables are to be included in the "true" model, formulated in general terms in equations (2) and (3) (2000) show that under the assumption that the marginal prior density of model j (M j ) is multivariate normally distributed as proposed by Zeller's g-prior structure and that all models have equal prior probability, the expectation of the posterior distribution of the parameters ( ) in a regression with data set (Ω) is given by ( |Ω) = ∑ ( |Ω)2
=1
, while its variance can be approximated by
where
, and is the number of observations, the number of regressors and the sum of squared errors in regression . In this setup the posterior inclusion probability of a variable, which can be calculated by taking the sum of ( |Ω) across all specifications in which this variable is included, gives an assessment of whether the variable should be included in the model and the ratio of the posterior expectation to the posterior variance can be considered as a measure of the efficiency of this variable. In particular Sala-i-Martin et al. (2000) suggest that variables with a posterior inclusion probability exceeding the prior (of 0.5) should be considered to be part of a model while Masanjala and Papageorgiou (2008) state that a variable is "efficient" if the ratio of posterior expectation to variance exceeds 1 in absolute value.
Data
We use individual level data from European Labour Force Survey (ELFS) for the years 2004 to 2011 for 14 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic;
Denmark, Spain, Finnland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, UK) which provide data on the country of birth of their residents and where the foreign born population is large enough to allow for a detailed analysis as well as
Norway to estimate the probit regression underlying the decomposition in equation (1). 3
Dependent Variables
The ELFS is a representative survey conducted in these countries that (amongst others) asks respondents on their country of birth and (if born abroad) on their duration of stay in the respective country as well as on demographic characteristics (such as age, gender, marital status number of children and others) and labour market status (which may be employed, unemployed and inactive). Thus from the data the number and structure of foreign born residing in a country as well as their employment status can be calculated.
The data are, however, only a sample of the households in the EU27 and are thus subject to sampling error. To reduce this we estimate equation (1) We focus on employment and unemployment probabilities as dependent variables, since these have been considered to be central indicators of labour market integration by a number of studies (Rendall et al. 2010 , Cangiano 2012 , Antecol et al. 2004 , Kogan 2006 and have also been shown to be important determinants of the net fiscal contribution of immigrants to European welfare states (Huber and Oberdabernig 2013, OECD 2013 
Independent variables for Oaxaca -Blinder decomposition
As control variables in the probit regressions underlying the first step OaxacaBlinder decomposition we use set of dummy variables for human capital (education which may be compulsory, vocational or upper secondary and tertiary) and age (dummies for 15-24, 25-44 and 45-64 year olds) and augment these by a dummy variable for gender, to control for the sizeable gender differences in our dependent variables in many EU countries. . We expect these share to affect both the explained component (since they measure the ability of immigrants) and the unexplained component (since for instance certain groups may be exposed to discrimination) of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. In addition we include the Herfindahl index of immigrant shares coming from the above regions as a measure of the ethnic diversity of immigrants in a country that is often used in the literature on ethnic diversity (e.g. Alesina et al., 2003) as an additional control in both the explained component (to control for immigrants differing preferences for ethnic diversity) and the unexplained component (as diversity may complicate the integration of immigrants) of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. percentage points. This thus confirms that the compositional effects captured in the explained part of the Oaxaca-Binder decomposition contribute only a (small) part to the total differences in immigrants' labour market outcomes relative to natives across countries. Furthermore, explained and unexplained differences in employment probabilities are negatively correlated to explained and unexplained differences in unemployment probabilities. Thus, as could be expected, countries where immigrants have higher unemployment probabilities than natives due to observable differences or due to unexplained reasons, also have employment higher employment probabilities due the same components. This correlation is, however, not always perfect. For instance in the Netherlands the unexplained component for unemployment rates was 0.21 -16 -percentage points in the average of the three periods considered while it was only -0.08 for unemployment rates.
Results
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{Figure 1: Around here} Table 4 Africa as well as from the Rest of Africa). In addition in the analysis of the unemployment probability the adjusted coverage rate by collective agreements and in the in the analysis of the employment probability effective tax rates and the generosity of old age benefits attain a posterior inclusion probability of more than 0.5 but fail to be efficient. This is therefore evidence of the important role played by wage bargaining institutions and the sending country structure for the selection of migrants to a particular country. This is also confirmed by the posterior means of the coefficients. These suggest that countries with a higher centralisation of wage bargaining and higher minimum wages attract migrants with a lower probability of unemployment and a higher probability of employment relative to natives on account of more favourable observable In sum therefore the sending country structure of immigrants and wage bargaining institutions in a country are the most important determinants of the quality of immigrants received by a country for labour market integration, with the signs of the coefficients for these variables according to theoretical expectations. Migration policy variables, by contrast, fail to be important throughout, while the tax and welfare benefit system variables are important only for the selection of migrants with respect to their employment probability, with the impact of old age benefits on the ability of migrants to integrate in the host countries' labour markets having an unexpected positive sign. One explanation for this lack of importance of migration policy variables in the selection of migrants in terms of ability to integrate in host countries' labour markets may be that European labour migration regulations are not skill-selective enough to influence the structure of migration over and above what can be considered to be determined by the sending country structure An explanation for the unexpected positive impact of the -18 -generosity of old age benefits is that such benefits attract particularly able migrants as their employment allows them to secure old age benefits when in pension.
BACE Results for the explained components
BACE Results for the unexplained component
Looking at the results for the unexplained part of the Oaxaca decomposition in table 5, by contrast, for the unexplained component of unemployment probabilities five variables attain a posterior inclusion probability exceeding the 0.5 mark as well as being efficient. These are the MIPEX index for the stringency of anti-discrimination policies, union density, the share of immigrants from the Middle East and Northern Africa, product market regulation and the adjusted coverage rate of collective agreements. The coefficients of these variables are highly consistent with prior expectations. The negative coefficient for the share of immigrants from the Middle East and Northern Africa implies that, for reasons other than their education and age, immigrants from this region have higher unemployment rate probabilities than others. This may be indication of discrimination against these immigrants or alternatively of particular problems in transferring human capital by these immigrants.
The negative coefficient on adjusted coverage rates of collective agreements suggests that countries with higher adjusted coverage rates of collective agreements, have higher unemployment probabilities among migrants relative to natives after controlling for observable differences in characteristics between these groups, while the negative coefficient of union density suggests that countries with higher union density tend to have larger unemployment rate differences between observationally equivalent migrants and natives. This implies that unions often act as organisations that insulate native "insiders" from potential labour market competition of foreign born outsiders.
The positive coefficient on product market regulation, by contrast, implies that countries with more stringent product market regulation have lower unemployment rate differentials between immigrants and natives after controlling for observable -19 - characteristics. This may be because in such countries immigrants have easier access to self-employment. The only coefficient that does not accord with prior expectations is the negative coefficient on the stringency of antidiscrimination policies. This may, however, be due to such a higher stringency leading to increased labour supply of immigrants but not necessarily higher employment probabilities -a finding that is corroborated by the low posterior inclusion probability of this variable for the employment rate {Table 5: around here}
In addition, for the unexplained component of the employment probability the share of recent immigrants, product market regulation, the share of immigrants from Southeast Asia, the adjusted coverage rate of collective agreements, a more diverse ethnic composition of the immigrant groups and union density attain posterior inclusion probabilities exceeding 0.5 and are also efficient. Also the posterior coefficient signs of these variables accord with expectation and indicate that countries with a higher share of immigrants from Southeast Asia, a lower share of recent immigrants, lower union density, a higher ethnic diversity among their immigrants, a higher adjusted coverage rate of collective agreements and with weaker product market regulation have higher employment probabilities among their immigrants relative to natives for unexplained reasons. Once more therefore the structure of migration and wage bargaining institutions seem to be important determinants of labour market integration of immigrants rather than migration policy and or welfare state variables.
Conclusions
This paper is concerned with the importance of national migration policy and labour market institutions for determining immigrants' labour market outcomes. Our -20 -results suggest that in general the structure of immigrants to a country in terms of diversity sending country structure and the wage bargaining institutions of a country are the most important factors impacting on labour market integration in a country, while variables related to the generosity of the welfare state and the progressivity of taxation and even more so variables measuring different aspects of migration policy remain to be less important determinants. In countries with more centralized wage bargaining, stricter product market regulation (and potentially also employment protection) as well as countries with a higher union density, labour market outcomes of immigrants relative to natives tend to be worse even after controlling for compositional effects. In addition immigrants with ex-ante better expectations of labour market integration on account of observable characteristics self-select to countries with more centralised wage bargaining and higher minimum wages but a lower coverage rate by collective agreements.
These results apply to both employment and unemployment rates relative to natives as measures of labour market integration and imply that liberal product market regulation (to allow immigrants to more easily enter self-employment) and less centralised wage bargaining (to increase wage flexibility towards immigrants working in low wage jobs) and ensuring inclusive trade unions could assist most in facilitating the integration of immigrants in host countries' labour markets. 
Migration policy
We take data from the MIPEX data base to measure migration policy in EU countries. 
Labour market and social policy
National data on labour market institutions and social policy by contrast was compiled from a variety of sources of standard sources. In particular we focus on the following indicators (see also Data on labour market flexibility -here we use the data on employment protection legislation and on product market regulation from OECD sources, with the later being included to capture any potential regulations impacting on the possibility for immigrants to enter selfemployment Data on the generosity of the welfare state and work incentives -under this heading we collect data on replacement rates including social and housing markets, and data on marginal tax rates (as captured by the effective marginal tax rate when moving from unemployment to employment in a job earning 33% of the average national income) also provided by OECD.
Data on wage bargaining and trade union organisation 
